Total Force Structure Transformation
by SgtMaj Bradley Trudell
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SgtMaj Trudell has served in both the Marine Active and Reserve Components. He has three MOSs: communications repairman, tank crewman, and 9999. The sergeant major has served in Beirut (1983), Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (1990–01), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Fallujah, 2006.) He will retire in December and is employed by a commercial nuclear power generation plant. This article was his Chase Prize Essay Contest entry.
Furl the colors on 4th Marine Division infantry regiments. Roll the Reserve Component (RC) infantry battalions into reorganized Active Component (AC) regiments. Examine, recommend, and implement similar changes in the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and 4th Marine Logistics Group. A plan is urgently needed to radically restructure the existing Marine Forces Reserve (MFR). The case for change is made while fully acknowledging the indisputable fact that MFR Marines have turned in superlative performance during the conduct of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) despite considerable bureaucratic obstacles and institutional prejudices and outdated organizational structure that currently impede efficient use of the RC.
Challenging conventional wisdom and presenting arguments for a new and better way of doing business is difficult—though necessary—to challenge the status quo in order to make improvements. The suggestion to deactivate RC infantry regiments and integrate their battalions with AC regiments is definitely a challenge of conventional wisdom. It will assuredly meet with much resistance.
That there is great misunderstanding about the structure and capabilities of the Marine Corps as a total force and MFR, in particular, is an obvious fact. It is widely misunderstood by Marines how the total force is structured, but it is absolutely fundamental to our leadership at all levels to understand basic force structure. This misunderstanding creates divisive misconceptions and misuse by both the AC and RC members. The terms “active duty” and “reservist” are often used erroneously and, occasionally, derogatorily. The AC consists of those Marines whose individual contracts place them on an active duty status for a specified duration whether in the Operating Forces or Support Establishment.
There are no further subcategories of AC. The RC consists of Marines whose contract places them in one of several different subcategories in which they can occasionally laterally move. Those categories are Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR), Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Active Reserves, Individual Ready Reserves, and retired Reserves. Retired Reserves consist of Marines who are retired from both the AC and RC. Marines whose entire careers have been AC become RC at the time of their retirement. AC Marines aren’t referred to as “activists,” so why refer to RC Marines as “reservists”? A Marine is a Marine. Each category has pursuant laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to it specifically. At any given time, RC members, regardless of category, can be activated, thus becoming “active duty Marines.” This should not be confused with becoming an AC Marine, which would require a contract change.
For further edification, the term “fleet” is often used inaccurately. Fleet is synonymous with deployment. Any Marine who can be deployed, whether AC or RC, is a fleet Marine. Ergo, there are many AC Marines serving in support billets, such as schools, including drill instructors and such who are not fleet Marines though they are on active duty. Meanwhile, the great majority of RC Marines are indeed fleet Marines as they are not generally assigned to support billets and are subject to activation and deployment with little notice. One example that illustrates the misunderstanding, misuse, and inefficiency between AC and RC Marines is the Gazette’s Chase Prize Essay Contest being limited to “Marines on active duty” and “SMCR Marines.” Why limit the contest?
The above clarification of AC and RC is necessary to properly present and delineate an argument for the dissolution of the RC infantry regiments and the realignment of the battalions. As currently existing, there are three infantry regiments in 4th Marine Division—the 23d, 24th, and 25th. Each regiment consists of the standard three battalions and a headquarters and service company. An MFR infantry regiment or regimental headquarters (HQ) has not been used in a warfighting capacity since World War II. During the current warfighting operations there has not been, and it does not appear likely that there will be, a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 23, 24, or 25 in theater in the foreseeable future. Every RC infantry battalion has gone forward, some multiple times, being fed into the fight with an AC RCT. Entering our sixth year of OEF/OIF, this would seem to be evidence that the RC regimental structure is not necessary but that the battalions themselves are.
If RC regiments don’t go to war, what do they do, and why do they exist? Are RC regiments still relevant? When RC battalions go to war, they are identified for activation, given a widely moving target date for activation, and told to get ready. Then the agony begins. The Marines want to do what they joined the Marine Corps to do and what they are trained for, but there are critical discrepancies between the design and reality of existing forces. Manning shortfalls are dire. The RC has few company grade officers, and the number is dwindling. There are no second lieutenants, few first lieutenants, and a handful of captains. Majors and lieutenant colonels are plentiful. From the Headquarters Marine Corps perspective, the remedy to the problem of the RC is to fix it yourself!
This is not the 1940s when the entire Nation was mobilized for war (the last time RC regiments were used). Currently, companies with only one or two officers or no officers are not rare. There exists a similar dearth of staff noncommissioned officers, though not quite so dismal in comparison. Determining an attributable origin to these shortages is difficult and consists of many factors.
The financial burden of being an RC Marine limits available manpower resources. The need to balance civilian careers with military time demands is exceedingly difficult and often costly to the individual. For units identified to be activated next, the call goes out across not just the regiment but also across 4th Marine Division to solicit volunteers to fill the table of organization (T/O) gaps. This creates a domino effect of manpower drain as individuals will interunit transfer to go to the fight with a unit now and be unavailable later with their original units. In some cases this was temporarily fixed by using B billet AC Marines who had not previously been to the fight. That resource has dried up as the war continues. The result is we are fielding individual battalions by sourcing the entire division, one individual Marine at a time. The T/Os are filled as best as they can be, the training is completed, and the unit and Marines successfully deploy as has been clearly demonstrated many times.
Individual RC regiments are geographically spread across many states and vast areas. With a total of three RC regiments, the country is basically divided into thirds. Regardless of regiment, the distances between the HQ and the battalions are great. The regimental staff is made up of a mixture of AC and RC Marines. The commander is an AC colonel. While the role of the regiment should conceivably be that of facilitator to the battalions in all things, it can be a hindrance, creating an accordion effect on decisionmaking when time is of the essence. So what does the regimental staff and the HQ do? As mentioned earlier, they don’t go to war. Therefore they train for the sake of training and provide individuals to units throughout the division as necessary and as tasked.
The regiments have become almost strictly administrative and are no longer tactical in nature. In essence the RC regiments are functioning only as force providers to the AC by combining the strength of undermanned battalions with individuals from other undermanned battalions in order to make T/O one battalion at a time. Is it sustainable? So far this has been an inefficient, though combat effective, policy and has provided competent, fully manned battalions that have performed very well in combat. It has, in fact, been argued that many AC units are just as good as RC units.
While this fits the bill in the arena of immediate operational necessity, it is not truly sustainable and does not provide a genuine strategic Reserve. This all points to the need for an overhaul of the existing RC structure. A better use of resources would be to deactivate the RC regiments and associate the RC battalions with an AC regiment. The resulting increase in efficiencies across the board will pay great dividends in combat as well as fiscally. A restructuring would work as follows. 25th Regiment HQ would furl its colors, and 1st Battalion, 25th Marines (1/25) would become 4/8. The other regiments and battalions would do the same. The RC battalion would remain RC; that is, its members would perform drills and annual training as they do now.
The RC battalion HQ and companies would remain at their current locations and report to their new higher regimental HQ, located as they are on established bases. The geography would essentially be transparent as most existing RC battalions are remote from their higher HQ and the same with the companies. As a fourth battalion in the regiment, resources, including personnel, would be shared as they currently are. When 1/8 needs plus-ups, 4/8 would be solicited along with the rest of the regiment. The affiliation would be mutually beneficial. 4/8 could not be tasked exactly like 2/8 or 3/8 to provide specific numbers due to its RC nature pursuant to federal law. The AC regiments could provide greater access to training areas and school opportunities on an individual and a unit basis. The closer affiliation would enhance AC-RC cooperation. AC units could take advantage of individual RC Marine skill sets whether civilian or military, from the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program to computers.
From a purely fiscal advantage standpoint, the deactivation of RC regiments is substantial. There are currently three regimental HQ’s worth of gear that is not and will not be used for warfighting, such as communications gear, motor transportation assets, etc. What about the HQ personnel? The immediate reaction from many Marines when discussing unit deactivation is to decry the impact on the Marines in the unit and how it will affect promotions. What billets and promotion opportunities would be available for Marines? The answer is simple and brutal. The Marine Corps, both AC and RC, exists to provide for the national defense. Promotion opportunities for senior officers and enlisted personnel are a result of leadership necessity not individual desire or benefit.
As the current RC regimental staffs are composed of AC and RC, and the total force end strength is being increased, there are boat spaces available for qualified, competent individual Marines in many places. As proposed to adjust AC regiments by adding the RC battalion, the AC regimental staffs would be slightly increased to facilitate the increased demands of the additional battalion. The additional billets created would be filled by the Marines displaced from the deactivated RC regiments with no net increase in AC end strength and no genuine loss of opportunity excepting the three Marine expeditionary force commanders. The existing RC regimental HQ facilities would be closed saving considerable fiscal resources to be available for use elsewhere.
The greatest obstacles to change are institutional inertia and personal agenda. It is time to genuinely rethink and reengineer not just the RC but also our entire total force structure. It is time to stop fighting the Cold War with a nonviable strategic Reserve and fight the current war while preparing for future operations with a sustainable and integrated total force.
